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Abstract
Firms strategically disclose product information in order to attract consumers, but
recipients often find it costly to process all of it, especially when products have complex
features. We study a model of competitive information disclosure by two senders, in
which the receiver may garble each sender’s experiment, subject to a cost increasing in
the informativeness of the garbling. As long as attention costs are not too low, there
is an interval of prior means over which it is an equilibrium for both senders to offer
full information, which interval expands as attention costs grow. Information on one
sender substitutes for information on the other, which allows the receiver to nullify the
profitability of a deviation. We thus provide a novel channel through which competition
encourages information disclosure.
Keywords: Bayesian persuasion; Information design; Multiple senders; Competition; Ratio-
nal Inattention; Search
JEL Classifications: D82; D83
∗Corresponding author. Department of Economics, The University of of Texas at Austin. Email:
vasudha.jain@utexas.edu.
†Department of Economics, The University of Texas at Austin.
Thanks to V Bhaskar, Max Stinchcombe, and especially Vasiliki Skreta for helpful comments.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
09
25
5v
1 
 [e
co
n.T
H]
  2
2 J
ul 
20
19
Constant attention wears the active mind,
Blots out our powers, and leaves a blank behind.
Charles Churchill
Epistle to William Hogarth
1 Introduction
The standard Bayesian persuasion framework allows senders to design arbitrarily informative
signal structures, and assumes that receivers costlessly process all information made available
to them. This is an unrealistic assumption in many natural contexts, in which agents may
rationally choose to stay partly ignorant. Moreover, there are many situations in which
multiple senders compete via information provision to be chosen by the agent. In this
competitive scenario, we ask how the consumer’s information-processing, or attention, costs
shape the information provided by the senders.
Consider, for instance, the situation encountered by doctors. Patients rely on their doctors
to make important medical decisions for them, such as the decision of which medication to
take. Very often, multiple drugs exist to treat the same condition, but nevertheless differ
in subtle ways that can prove crucial for patients. Which alternative is best might depend
on the particular circumstances of individual patients; eg., someone’s medical history might
make him more prone to the side effects of one of them.
A well intentioned doctor has her task clearly cut out–she should study all primary
research published on each drug, and let that information guide her prescription decisions.
This means that when she reads about a clinical trial, she should dig into details such as
whether, for instance, adverse side effects had led many trial subjects of a certain demographic
group to drop out midway, or whether the drug had a differential impact depending on the
stage of the illness.
However, getting detailed information involves substantial time and effort, and doctors
typically find it difficult to keep up. Tellingly, Alper et al. (2004) find that it would take a
doctor six hundred hours to skim all research relevant to general practice that is published in
just one month. Consequently, they might pay attention only to some published summary
statistics.
Pharmaceutical companies are prohibited from falsifying facts when marketing to doctors.
They do, however, strategically decide how much information to reveal and in what form,
and in doing so, take into consideration the lack of attention on the part of the recipients:
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designing pamphlets in a way that the most favorable pieces of evidence stand out, or
other strategies of that ilk. As Goldacre (2014) explains, “They (doctors) need good quality
information, but they need it, crucially, under their noses. The problem of the modern world
is not information poverty, but information overload...So doctors will not be going through
every trial, about every treatment relevant to their field...They will take shortcuts, and these
shortcuts can be exploited [emphasis added].”
Motivated by this setting, we study a model of information disclosure á la Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011), with two senders, and a receiver who can save on attention costs by
adopting a less informative experiment than what is chosen by the senders. The question we
are interested in is how, and to what extent, the degree of attention costs matters for the
relationship between competition and information disclosure.
More specifically, our model has two senders who simultaneously commit to a Blackwell
experiment for the quality of their respective products, which are ex-ante identical. A receiver,
who wishes to choose the sender with a higher quality, visits the senders sequentially. When
she visits the first one, she observes the distribution of beliefs induced by his (the sender’s)
experiment, and is free to choose any mean preserving contraction, or garbling, of that. Think
back to the doctor example, and the shortcuts she might take: she might read just the first
few pages of an article, only the nontechnical parts, only the technical sections, or even just
the title. All of these correspond to different levels of information, and all of these impose on
the receiver different costs–a grueling slog through a complicated model takes more out of
the receiver than does a quick skim of the conversational portions.
We capture this relationship by imposing that the more the receiver garbles (and hence
the less information she acquires), the lower her attention costs are. Intuitively, it is less
costly to draw from a distribution that is more concentrated around the prior, and hence
involves less learning about the state. She faces a clear trade-off, since a garbling corresponds
to a less informative experiment, and is less valuable for her decision problem (Blackwell
1951, 1953).
After taking a draw from her chosen garbling at the first sender, the receiver forms
a posterior belief about that sender before deciding whether to visit the second sender.
Importantly, we do not impose that the receiver must visit the second sender in order to
choose him. As we show later on, this allows for the realistic scenario in which a receiver will
have “seen enough” at the first sender and need not visit the second sender: her belief about
the first sender may be so high that she chooses him without ever visiting the second, and
it may be so low that she chooses the second, sight unseen. If she does decide to visit the
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second sender, the protocol is identical to that for the first sender: she chooses a garbling of
his chosen experiment subject to an information cost. Finally, she chooses the sender favored
by her posterior beliefs. Each sender wants to maximize the probability of being chosen.
Since the receiver’s decision to choose a less informative signal than is being offered is
the result of an optimization problem that accounts for attention costs, she is rationally
inattentive.1 The particular framework of rational inattention that we adopt is the same as in
Lipnowski et al. (2019) and Wei (2018). The former paper considers the problem of a principal
whose preferences over actions are perfectly aligned with those of an agent. Attention costs
are borne only by the agent, and the authors establish conditions under which the principal
would want to restrict her information with a view to manipulating her attention. Wei (2018),
like us, considers a binary types, binary action model with a single sender who has state
independent preferences, and an exogenous threshold of acceptance for the receiver. He shows
that it is always optimal for the principal to design a strictly less informative experiment
than what would be chosen by the agent himself, if offered full information.
In contrast, we show that if two senders compete, then as long as attention costs are not
too low, there is an interior interval of prior means over which it is an equilibrium for both
senders to offer full information. Moreover, the interval expands as attention costs grow, and
approaches the full range as they explode.
Intuitively, this happens because when choosing between two alternatives, information
on the quality of one of them substitutes, to an extent, for information on the quality of
the other. For instance, learning that one drug is of very poor quality is useful for the
decision of a doctor, even if she learns nothing about the quality of the other. Furthermore,
because of attention costs, the receiver obtains less information on each sender than is being
offered. Then starting from a situation of full disclosure, if a sender deviates to provide less
information than the receiver would obtain on path, she can compensate for it by using some
of the ‘surplus’ information on the other sender. For values of the prior where we obtain the
full information equilibrium, this happens in a way that she maintains the probability of
making a correct choice, and the deviating sender does not gain.
2 Related Literature
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to look at competitive information design
with information processing costs faced by the receiver.
1See Sims (2003).
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This relates thematically to several strands of the literature. One of them is competitive
information design without any attention costs. With two senders, this has been studied
(albeit with slightly different timing than what we consider) by Boleslavsky and Cotton (2015),
who identify the unique equilibrium. Hulko and Whitmeyer (2018) extend this analysis to
n > 2 senders, while also incorporating the possibility of search frictions. Crucially, providing
full information is not an equilibrium with zero attention costs, and we show that this
continues to hold for positive but small attention costs.
Some other papers in that literature that bear mentioning are Au and Kawai (2017a,b),
Albrecht (2017), Boleslavsky and Cotton (2018) and Board and Lu (2018). The result that
competition encourages information disclosure is familiar from some of these, but introducing
attention costs offers a novel perspective on why that might be true. In short, with attention
costs deviations are no longer profitable: in the receiver’s subsequent search problem, she
only ever learns from one sender and should one sender deviate and be less forthcoming, she
simply chooses to learn from the other.
Our work is also related to the small but growing literature on persuasion of a rationally
inattentive receiver by a single sender. The Introduction discusses the models of Wei (2018)
and Lipnowski et al. (2019). Bloedel and Segal (2018) take a different approach to a similar
problem. In their framework, after observing the sender’s experiment, but before seeing its
realization, the receiver can choose a mapping from signal realizations to distributions over
‘perceptions’, incurring an entropy reduction cost. Then, the receiver observes the realized
perception, and not the actual signal realization. As Lipnowski et al. (2019) explain, this
is conceptually different from our paper (and theirs), since the receiver in our model pays
a cost to reduce uncertainty about the state, and not the sender’s message. Matyskova
(2018) studies a persuasion model where the receiver, after observing the realization from the
sender’s signal, can acquire additional information on the state at a cost proportional to the
reduction in entropy.
On the other hand, a few papers look at what happens if costs are instead on the
sender’s side. Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014) look at optimal persuasion mechanisms
when the sender pays higher costs (proportional to entropy reduction) of designing more
informative experiments. Likewise, Treust and Tomala (2017) consider constraints on the
sender’s information transmission channel. The sender in their paper has n copies of identical
persuasion problems, but is constrained to send only k < n messages, which are transmitted
with exogenous noise. Interestingly, they find that the sender’s payoff from the optimal
solution is the concave closure of his payoff function, net of entropy reduction costs. Thus,
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these costs arise endogenously in their model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4
presents results for the benchmark with a single sender. Section 5 presents the equilibrium
analysis with two senders and spells out how the level of attention costs matters. Section 6
concludes. The Appendix contains proofs that are not presented in the main text.
3 Model
There are two senders indexed by i ∈ {1, 2}, and a receiver (R). Sender i has type ωi ∈
Ωi := {0, 1}, with the types being drawn independently. The common prior belief is that
Pr(ωi = 1) = µ ∈ (0, 1) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
R has to select one of the two senders, and she has no outside option.2 Her payoff is equal
to the type of the selected sender, minus attention costs that we elaborate on below. Sender
i’s payoff is 1 if he is selected, and 0 if not. All players maximize expected payoffs. The game
proceeds in the following 3 stages.
Stage 0: Each (ex-ante uninformed) sender simultaneously commits to a Blackwell
experiment that generates information about his own type. Such an experiment is a mapping
from {0, 1} to the set of Borel probability measures over a compact metric space of signal
realizations. Each signal realization, then, is associated with a posterior belief distribution on
{0, 1}, and an experiment induces a distribution over posterior beliefs. Hereafter, we identify
a posterior belief with the belief on ωi = 1.
From the work of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), we know that the set of Blackwell
experiments is isomorphic to the set of distributions of posterior beliefs whose average is
the prior. Thus, at this stage 0, sender i commits to a distribution pi ∈ ∆[0, 1], with∫
[0,1]
x pi(dx) = µ.
Stage 1: R, who at this point does not observe the chosen distributions, decides whether
to visit any sender, and if yes, which one.
Say she visits sender 1 first. Upon visiting she observes 1’s distribution p1, and is free to
choose any q1 that is a mean preserving contraction (or garbling) of p1.3 Associated with any
2Our results hold with an outside option, as long as its expected quality is not too high.
3q is a garbling of p if the random variable associated with q second order stochastically dominates–and
has the same mean as–the random variable associated with p. It is a strict garbling if additionally q 6= p.
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such q1 is a attention cost given by the following:
C(q1) =
∫
[0,1]
k(x− µ)2q1(dx),
where k > 0.
Associated with each posterior x is a cost k(x − µ)2, and the cost of a distribution of
posteriors is its expectation under that distribution.4 Since k(x− µ)2 is convex, by Jensen’s
inequality we have
q is a garbling of p =⇒ C(q) ≤ C(p),
with the inequality strict for strict garblings. For instance, C(q) is minimized when q is the
degenerate distribution δµ, and maximized when it has support {0, 1}.
R takes a draw from q1, which determines her posterior belief about sender 1. She faces a
trade-off in her choice of q1, because a garbling costs less, but also corresponds to a (Blackwell)
less informative experiment and is less valuable for her decision problem. Note that the
sender’s chosen distribution pj determines R’s choice set and, loosely speaking, puts a cap on
how much she can learn. It does not, however, directly determine her attention cost.
Stage 2: R then decides whether to visit sender 2. If she does, she observes p2 and
chooses a garbling q2, once again incurring an attention cost C(q2). She takes a draw from q2,
which determines her posterior belief about this sender. Finally, she chooses the sender for
whom her posterior belief is higher.5 She need not have visited a sender or learned anything
from him in order to select him.
Notice that R’s optimal garbling at stage 2 potentially depends on the belief she draws at
stage 1. She may be more or less inclined to learn about the second sender, depending on
how much uncertainty has already been resolved about the first one. Indeed, as we shall see,
if the stage 1 belief is close enough to 0 or 1, she chooses not to learn at all at stage 2, and
this fact plays a crucial role in our analysis.
The distribution offered by the sender visited first dictates how much can be learned at
stage 1. Then in light of the preceding observation, if both senders offer different distributions,
4See Caplin et al. (2019) for a discussion on posterior separable cost functions.
5The posteriors may be equal only if she visits neither sender. Then she may randomize between the
senders in any way. If she visits at least one of them, the garblings chosen by her would never be such that
the two posteriors can be the same. See Footnote 10.
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the choice of whom to visit first (if anyone) matters for payoffs.
A pure strategy for sender i is a choice of a distribution pi ∈ ∆[0, 1] whose average is µ.
A pure strategy for R consists of i) a choice of which sender to visit first, if any; ii) a choice
of garbling for any distribution offered by the sender she visits first; iii) a choice of whether
to visit the second sender for each belief drawn in the previous stage; iv) a choice of garbling
for the second sender, for each distribution offered by him and each posterior belief drawn in
the previous stage. Our solution concept is Subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies6
(hereafter, equilibrium), defined in the standard way.
Before proceeding to our analysis, we point out the following characterization of the set
of garblings of a binary distribution, which we shall extensively use:
q is a garbling of a distribution with support{ν1, ν2} ⇐⇒ supp(q) ⊆ [min{ν1, ν2},max{ν1, ν2}].
4 Benchmark: Single sender
We begin by taking a brief look at what happens if there is only a single sender. R chooses
a garbling of that sender’s distribution and accepts his product if the belief drawn from it
is above a threshold λ ∈ (0, 1). If λ < µ, it is a trivial observation that any sender optimal
distribution is such that nothing is learned and he is accepted with certainty. For example,
he can simply design an uninformative experiment.
Now say λ > µ. If k = 0, then we have a standard Bayesian persuasion problem, and we
know from prior work that the sender’s optimal distribution has support {0, λ}. If k > 0,
this is no longer the optimal solution, because the garbling chosen by R in response to that
would be δµ, and the sender would not be accepted. This is easy to see intuitively–at a belief
λ, R is indifferent between accepting and rejecting. When offered {0, λ}, her gross payoff
from choosing any garbling is the same as the payoff from rejecting with certainty. But then
there is no reason for her to pay a cost to acquire any information. To make it worth her
while to do so, the sender would have to allow her to generate beliefs above λ.
Wei (2018) shows that the setup with a single sender permits two simplifications.7 One,
the sender’s problem can be solved subject to an incentive compatibility constraint, which
imposes that R should not want to garble the distribution offered. This leads to the second
6Except that we allow R to randomize over the order of visits.
7His analysis is for a generic continuous convex cost function instead of −k(x− µ)2. Tractability in our
two-sender problem requires a specific functional form.
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simplification, which is that it is without loss to restrict attention to binary and degenerate
distributions. (Since R has only two actions, she never wants to pay to generate more than
two beliefs.)
The following proposition summarizes the results for this benchmark case.
Proposition 1. Suppose there is a single sender, and R has a threshold of acceptance λ > µ.
Then,
1. An equilibrium exists.
2. In any equilibrium, the sender chooses a distribution that is strictly less informative
(in the Blackwell sense) than the distribution the receiver would choose if offered full
information.
Proof. See Wei (2018). 
In response to full information, say R would choose the garbling with support {ν1, ν2}
where ν1 < λ < ν2. Then this result says that in equilibrium, the distribution offered by the
sender would be a strict garbling of this. The intuition roughly is that although the sender
cannot implement the first best solution {0, λ}, he can still restrict R’s learning so that the
higher belief in the support is below ν2, and the probability of its realization is higher.
As we see in the next section, introducing an additional sender yields an interesting
comparison to this.
5 Equilibrium analysis with two senders
We now analyze the game described in Section 3, for an arbitrary k > 0 and µ ∈ (0, 1).
To start off, recall our observation that R’s order of visits matters when the two distri-
butions on offer are different. In equilibrium R must correctly anticipate the distributions
chosen, and the order of visits must be a best response to those. However, since she does
not observe the chosen distributions at stage 0, any deviation by a sender goes undetected
until and unless he is visited. This has the following implication, which we note for further
reference.
Remark. Any deviation by a sender cannot affect either R’s decision to visit a sender, or the
order of her visits.
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Next, note that if both senders offer the same distribution, then R is indifferent between
the two orders of visit (if she visits anyone). The analysis below will make it clear that the
tie breaking rule in this case does not matter for our results, and we do not assume anything
about it.
We now turn to the question of equilibrium existence. Suppose that each of the two
senders offers no information, i.e the distribution δµ. Then upon visiting either sender, R
is also restricted to choosing δµ. But then she expects to gain nothing by visiting a sender,
and not visiting either of them is a best response. She may simply select sender 1 with any
probability p ∈ [0, 1], and sender 2 with probability 1− p. Clearly, if this best response is
played, a deviation by a sender goes undetected, and does not make any difference to the
outcome. Thus we have the following.
Claim 2 (Equilibrium existence). An equilibrium exists ∀µ ∈ (0, 1), k > 0. In particular,
there is always an equilibrium in which each sender offers an uninformative distribution.
Naturally, we are interested in finding other, more interesting equilibria. As shown in
Section 4, provision of full information is never an equilibrium with a single sender. The
following Proposition, which states our main result, establishes that competitive forces indeed
lead to such an equilibrium for some parameter values.
Proposition 3 (Full information equilibrium). 1. ∀k > 1/2, there is an equilibrium in
which both senders offer full information iff µ ∈ [ 1
4k
, 1− 1
4k
].
2. ∀k ∈ (0, 1/2], µ ∈ (0, 1), there is no equilibrium in which both senders offer full
information.
Note that this result does not imply that R ever chooses to learn a sender’s type perfectly,
and indeed the equilibrium existence result extends to any less informative distribution that
still allows her to choose what she does when offered full information.8
This result shows that the parameter in the attention cost function is crucial. If k is
above 1
2
, we obtain an interval of priors over which full information is an equilibrium, and
this interval expands as k grows. In the limit, as k →∞, the interval converges to (0, 1), the
full range of priors. Thus, by having higher attention costs, the receiver might elicit better
information from competing senders.
The following corollary states the same result differently.
8More on this in Section 5.2.2.
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Corollary 3.1. ∀µ ∈ (0, 1), there is an equilibrium in which both senders offer full information
iff k > max{ 1
4µ
, 1
4(1−µ)} (weak inequality if µ 6= 12).
Stated this way, one might conjecture that the result is trivially obtained because for
high enough values of k, R finds it optimal to not learn anything at all even when offered full
information. As it turns out, this is not the case, and for any finite k she does undertake
some learning from at least one sender when offered full information.
Instead, we obtain the existence result because for high enough values of k, R finds it
optimal to learn only about the quality of one sender, and completely ignore information on
the other. The analysis ahead will elaborate on how this fact plays a crucial role.
Section 5.2 provides a proof of this result (and presents additional results), but before we
move on to that, it is instructive to examine another benchmark, where k = 0.
5.1 Benchmark: No attention costs (k = 0)
When k = 0, it is costless for R to learn. This makes a significant difference to the analysis,
because she never has a strict incentive to garble either sender’s distribution.9 It is only
at stage 2 that she may garble, if the stage 1 draw is 0 or 1, since then her payoffs do not
depend on the stage 2 draw. For simplicity, here we assume that i) if the stage 1 draw is 0
(or 1), she rejects (or accepts) that sender without visiting the other one, and ii) if the draws
from both stages are the same, she selects the sender visited last.
Proposition 4 (No attention costs). Suppose k = 0. Then the following are true.
1. ∀µ ∈ (0, 1), there is an equilibrium in which both senders choose an uninformative
distribution.
2. ∀µ ∈ (0, 1), there is no equilibrium in which both senders offer full information.
The reason an uninformative equilibrium exists is identical to that for k > 0–it is a best
response for R to not visit either sender, but then a deviation is not detected and makes
no difference to the outcome. The reasoning behind non-existence of a full information
equilibrium, on the other hand, is very different for k = 0 and for small, positive k.
For k = 0, in response to full information from both senders, R visits either one of them,
learns his type perfectly, and immediately takes a decision. A sender’s deviation cannot make
9This setup has been studied in Boleslavsky and Cotton (2018), Hulko and Whitmeyer (2018) and other
papers, with the difference that they assume that R observes the chosen distributions at stage 0.
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a difference if he is not visited first. But if he is, a deviation to support {, 1} is profitable,
where  is arbitrarily close to zero. This is because if R’s draw from this distribution is , she
continues to learn from the second sender, and rejects him if the draw then is 0.
When k is any positive quantity, a deviation of this nature does not help–intuitively, even
if the stage 1 draw is a small, positive , R is sure enough of the quality of the first sender
that she does not find it worth her while to learn about the other one.
The following result establishes existence of other (less than fully) informative equilibria
when attention costs are absent.
Claim 5. 1. Let k = 0 and µ ≤ 1/2. There is an equilibrium in which each player chooses
the uniform distribution on [0, 2µ].
2. Let k = 0 and µ > 1/2. There is an equilibrium in which each sender chooses a CDF
with a continuous portion F (x) = x/(2µ) on [0, 2(1 − µ)] and a point mass of size
2− 1/µ on 1. In such an equilibrium, R’s decision about whom to visit first must be
fair (each sender is visited first with probability 1/2).
5.2 Positive attention costs (k > 0)
For positive attention costs, our main result pertains to the full information equilibrium,
which is stated in Proposition 3 above. We begin by showing why it is true, and for ease of
exposition present the key arguments for k = 1. The structure of the proof is the same for a
generic k > 0, and the details are relegated to the Appendix.
5.2.1 Full information equilibrium for k = 1
Recall that for k = 1, Proposition 3 states that full information is an equilibrium if and only
if µ ∈ [0.25, 0.75].
Start by considering any µ ∈ (0, 1), and suppose that each sender offers the distribu-
tion with support {0, 1}. To analyze R’s best response, we proceed in two steps–first, we
determine R’s stage 2 best response for each belief drawn at stage 1; second, we use that to
solve for the optimal stage 1 behavior. We make use of the technique of concavification for this.
R′s stage 2 best response: First let us find the optimal stage 2 garbling, if R visits
the sender at that stage.
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Say the draw from Stage 1 is x ∈ [0, 1]. Then, R selects the second sender if and only
if the stage 2 draw y turns out to be higher than x.10 Her payoff from a stage 2 belief y is
then max{x, y}, minus the attention cost associated with y. Denote this stage 2 payoff by
U2(y;x).
U2(y;x) = max{x, y} − (y − µ)2,
for x, y ∈ [0, 1].
This is piecewise concave in y, and Figure 1 plots it for a representative value of x.
Figure 1: R’s stage 2 payoffs
Now, since any distribution is a garbling of the one with support {0, 1}, we know from
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) that for any given x, R’s optimal garbling is determined
using the concavification of U2(y;x) over [0, 1]. The concavification is the red curve in Figure
2. It is evident that depending on where µ lies, the optimal distribution of beliefs is either
degenerate on µ, or is binary.
10It does not matter what we assume about the tie breaking rule when y = x. For any distribution offered,
x would not belong to the support of the garbling chosen at stage 2. The reasoning is similar to the argument
for why the standard Bayesian persuasion solution is not incentive compatible in the single-sender case (see
Section 4).
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Figure 2: Concavification of R’s stage 2 payoffs
Lemma 5.1 (Stage 2 optimal garbling). Suppose that R’s stage 1 draw is x ∈ [0, 1] and she
visits the sender at stage 2. R’s stage 2 optimal garbling is either degenerate or binary, and
its support is as follows.
1. If µ < 0.5, 
{x− 0.25, x+ 0.25} if 0.25 ≤ x < µ+ 0.25
{0,√x} if µ2 < x < 0.25
{µ} ifx ≤ µ2 or x ≥ µ+ 0.25
2. If µ = 0.5, {x− 0.25, x+ 0.25} if 0.25 < x < 0.75{µ} if x ≤ 0.25 or x ≥ 0.75
3. If µ > 0.5, 
{x− 0.25, x+ 0.25} if µ− 0.25 < x ≤ 0.75
{1−√1− x, 1} if 0.75 < x < 1− (1− µ)2
{µ} x ≤ µ− 0.25 or x ≥ 1− (1− µ)2
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The interesting thing to note here is that regardless of the prior, if the first stage draw is
either very high or very low, then R chooses not to learn anything from the second sender.
This is intuitive–for a high enough belief that the first sender’s quality is good, she deems
it very unlikely that the second sender is better, and does not invest in learning about him.
Instead, she accepts the first sender with certainty. Conversely, if the first stage draw is very
low, she accepts the second sender with certainty.
Further, the thresholds beyond which there is no learning at stage 2 depend on the prior.
The prior is the expected quality of the second sender, so the higher it is, the larger (smaller)
the range of first stage beliefs over which the second sender is accepted (rejected) without
learning.
If R does choose a binary distribution at stage 2, then she selects the second (first) sender
at the higher (lower) belief.
For any stage 1 draw, if the stage 2 optimal garbling involves any learning, R strictly
gains from visiting the second sender. If it does not involve any learning, R is indifferent
between making the second visit and not, and she may resolve this in any manner.
R’s stage 1 best response: Using the above result, it is straightforward to obtain R’s
first stage continuation payoffs for an arbitrary x, and determine her first stage optimal
garbling from its concavification over [0, 1]. This leads to the following.
Lemma 5.2 (Stage 1 optimal garbling). Any Bayes plausible distribution with support drawn
from the following sets is optimal for R at stage 1.
1. {µ− 0.25} ∪ [0.25, µ+ 0.25] if µ ∈ [0.25, 0.5].
2. [µ− 0.25, 0.75] ∪ {µ+ 0.25} if µ ∈ [0.5, 0.75].
3. {0, y1(µ)} if µ < 0.25, where y1(µ) ∈ (µ, 0.25).
4. {y2(µ), 1} if µ > 0.75, where y2(µ) ∈ (0.75, µ).
The exact expressions for y1(µ) and y2(µ) are not important. The main thing to note
here is that the stage 1 solution always involves some learning, and is unique if and only if
µ 6∈ [0.25, 0.75]. Interestingly, in spite of the fact that there are only two senders and binary
types in this model, R may choose to generate more than two beliefs at stage 1. The reason
is that each stage 1 belief is optimally followed by a different degree of learning at stage 2.
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Note also that since the stage 1 optimal distribution always involves learning, a visit is
necessarily made at this stage. R does not care which sender is visited first, and she may
randomize her choice in any way.
Since there are multiple best responses for µ ∈ [0.25, 0.75], we need to make a selection
among them. Notice that the most informative (in the Blackwell sense) of the optimal
distributions has support {µ− 0.25, µ+ 0.25}, and by Lemma 5.1, this is the only one among
them that is necessarily followed by no learning at stage 2. We assume that R breaks her
indifference in favor of this distribution. That is, when indifferent, she’d rather not put off
learning until the next stage.
In summary: if µ ∈ [0.25, 0.75], R’s best response to full information is the following. Visit
sender 1 with probability q ∈ [0, 1], and Sender 2 with probability 1− q. Choose the garbling
with support {µ− 0.25, µ+ 0.25} for the sender visited. If the belief drawn is µ− 0.25, select
the other sender without learning anything from him.11 If the belief drawn is µ+ 0.25, select
the visited sender without learning anything from the other one.12
We now know what happens on path if full information is offered. For µ ∈ [0.25, 0.75], it
turns out that we can rule out profitable deviations without exactly knowing R’s best response
to any deviation. For µ 6∈ [0.25, 0.75], we show that there exists a profitable deviation for a
sender.
No profitable deviation for µ ∈ [0.25, 0.75] : Consider what a sender achieves by
deviating. We have already seen that this does not affect the probability of being the one
to be visited first. Moreover, if he is not the one to be visited first, his payoffs are not
affected, since R does not plan to learn anything from him. So, we only need to consider
what happens if he deviates and is visited first. In this case, R’s behavior would be altered if
{µ− 0.25, µ+ 0.25} is not a garbling of the distribution he deviates to.
Now, say R visits a sender and finds out that she may no longer choose support {µ −
0.25, µ + 0.25}. Regardless of what the sender’s deviation is, though, she is permitted to
learn nothing, i.e choose support {µ}. By Lemma 5.2, this is one of her best responses, and
by Lemma 5.1, this would be optimally followed by visiting the other sender (who has not
deviated) and choosing support {µ− 0.25, µ+ 0.25} for him.
11Either by not visiting him at all, or by visiting but not learning.
12ibid.
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By responding to the deviation in this manner, R ensures a payoff equal to what is
attained in the absence of the deviation. Naturally, any other response specified in Lemma
5.2, if permissible under the deviation, would also give her the same payoff, and she may
choose that instead of support {µ}.
What this essentially implies is that in response to any deviation by the sender visited
first, R would choose from the set specified in Lemma 5.2, and depending on the belief she
draws, follow it with stage 2 behavior specified in Lemma 5.1.
This observation, and the next Lemma, are key to our analysis.
Lemma 5.3. ∀µ ∈ [0.25, 0.75], conditional on being visited first, a sender’s expected payoff
is the same for any of the receiver responses specified in Lemma 5.2.
This immediately implies that a unilateral deviation does not affect a sender’s payoffs,
and it is proven that full information is an equilibrium for µ ∈ [0.25, 0.75].
Let’s take a closer look at the intuition behind this. In the best case scenario for R, i.e
when both senders allow her perfect information, attention costs lead her to learn from only
one sender. Now, if the sender from whom she does learn on path deviates and restricts
her learning, she is able to compensate for it by learning more from the other sender. Such
adjustment is possible only in the presence of attention costs, for it is only then that she
has information on the other sender at hand, which she doesn’t learn in the absence of
the deviation. The ex-ante probability that she makes the correct choice thereby remains
unaffected, and the deviating sender is unable to gain. This clearly highlights why having
two senders instead of one leads to a full information equilibrium when the receiver is subject
to attention costs.
Existence of profitable deviation for µ 6∈ [0.25, 0.75]: When µ 6∈ [0.25, 0.75],
similar reasoning does not apply, since R’s best response is unique and involves learning from
both senders on path. In this case, there exists a deviation where a sender profitably restricts
R’s learning in case he is visited second, without affecting what happens if he is visited first.
In particular, say for instance µ < 0.25. Recall that in response to full information, R
chooses support {0, y1(µ)} at stage 1. Following belief 0 she immediately accepts the second
sender, and following belief y1(µ), she chooses support {0,
√
y1(µ)} at stage 2.
It can be shown that ∃p2 ∈ (y1(µ),
√
y1(µ)) such that if a sender deviates to {0, p2} and
is visited second (by R holding a belief y1(µ) from stage 1), R chooses {0, p2} instead of
{0,√y1(µ)}. If he is instead visited first, R’s best response is unchanged. Evidently this
deviation increases the probability of being selected, and is therefore profitable.
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5.2.2 Other equilibria for k > 0
The analysis so far tells us that for any k, first, an uninformative equilibrium always exists;
and second, a full information equilibrium exists for parameter values where R’s learning
strategy has particular features. Where the full information equilibrium is obtained, it is
natural to focus on it, since it must maximize R’s welfare.
As shown in Appendix A.1, it never happens in this equilibrium that R herself chooses
the fully informative distribution for any sender. In fact, in such an equilibrium she visits
only one sender and picks support {µ− 1
4k
, µ+ 1
4k
}.
It is then immediate that whenever full information is an equilibrium, there is a whole
class of equilibria that allow R to behave exactly the same way, and are therefore welfare
equivalent to it.
Claim 6. Suppose k > 1/2 and µ ∈ [ 1
4k
, 1 − 1
4k
]. For i ∈ {0, 1}, let pi ∈ ∆[0, 1] be any
distribution with expectation µ, and of which the distribution with support {µ− 1
4k
, µ+ 1
4k
} is
a garbling. Then, there is an equilibrium in which sender i offers the distribution pi.
The following can be obtained using this.
Corollary 6.1. 1. Let µ ≤ 1/2. Then there is an equilibrium in which both senders offer
the uniform distribution on [0, 2µ] if k ≥ 1/(2µ).
2. Let µ > 1/2. Then there is an equilibrium in which both senders offer a CDF with a
continuous portion F (x) = x/(2µ) on [0, 2(1− µ)] and a point mass of size 2− 1/µ on
1 if k ≥ 1/(2µ) for µ ≤ 2/3, and if k ≥ 1/(4(1− µ)) for µ ≥ 2/3.
The particular distributions from the above corollary are of interest, because recall from
Claim 5 that they are also equilibria in the k = 0 scenario, where full information is not an
equilibrium. In contrast, here these equilibria are outcome equivalent to full information.
The difference arises since with attention costs, both full information and these distributions
are garbled down to the same thing by R.
In fact, for the class of symmetric binary distributions there is a sharp result that goes
beyond Claim 6. Essentially, it tells us that if a symmetric binary equilibrium exists, so
must the full information equilibrium, and in fact it must be outcome equivalent to the full
information one. This reinforces our focus on a full information equilibrium.
Proposition 7. Let the distribution p have support {l, h} with l ∈ [0, µ) and h ∈ (µ, 1].
1. If k > 1
2(h−l) , it is an equilibrium for both senders to offer p iff µ ∈ [l + 14k , h− 14k ].
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2. If k ≤ 1
2(h−l) , it is not an equilibrium for both senders to offer p.
The proof uses arguments similar to those for the full information equilibrium.13 Note
that if p satisfies the conditions in part 1 of the proposition, then since l ≤ µ − 1
4k
and
h ≥ µ+ 1
4k
, the garbling {µ− 1
4k
, µ+ 1
4k
} is available to R. She gets to behave exactly as she
would under full information, and we saw in Proposition 6 that this gives us an equilibrium.
6 Conclusion
We study a model of information disclosure by two senders who compete to persuade a
receiver. The receiver, instead of passively accepting the experiment adopted by a sender,
may choose to garble it. The more she garbles, the less informative the experiment she
draws from, and the lower her attention costs are. We show how the amount of information
disclosed depends on the degree of attention costs, and how this differs from the setting with
a single sender.
We find that as long as attention costs are not too low, there is an interval of prior means
over which it is an equilibrium for both senders to disclose full information. Further, the
interval expands as attention costs grow, and approaches the full range in the limit. This is
despite the fact that full disclosure is not an equilibrium either when there are two senders
but no attention costs, or when there are attention costs but only one sender.
Our analysis provides clear intuition for the result. When the receiver faces a choice
between two senders, her only aim is to determine who is better, and information on the
quality of one of them serves as a partial substitute for information on the quality of the
other. Now, when she faces attention costs, she chooses a strict garbling of each sender’s
experiment, and leaves some information unlearned. Then, starting from a situation of full
disclosure, if one sender deviates and restricts her learning, she is able to compensate for it
by using some of the surplus information at hand on the other sender. This allows her to
maintain the overall quality of her information, so that the probability of making a correct
choice between the two senders is unchanged, and the deviating sender does not gain.
We motivated our study with the example of pharmaceutical companies strategically
disclosing information to prescribing physicians. The assumption of high attention costs,
as well as a low outside option for the receiver are reasonable in this context. Our model,
though a stylized one, provides an interesting insight into why more information on drug
quality might be made available when there is more competition.
13For h = 1, l = 0 this proposition is identical to Proposition 3.
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While we focus on this example, the model is well suited to study strategic disclosure
in numerous other settings where information is ‘complex’, eg. the disclosure of features of
retirement savings plans to consumers, or the informational content of political campaigns.
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A Proofs
Consider any k > 0 and µ ∈ (0, 1). Let each sender offer support {l, h}, with l ∈ [0, µ) and
h ∈ (µ, 1].
We begin by proving a series of Lemmata.
Lemma A.1. Suppose that R’s stage 1 draw is x ∈ [l, h] and she visits the sender at stage 2.
R’s stage 2 optimal garbling is either degenerate or binary, and its support is as follows.
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1. If k > 0.5
h−l and µ ≤ min{h− 12k , l + 12k}:
{µ} if x ∈ [l, l + k(µ− l)2]
{l, l +
√
x−l
k
} if x ∈ (l + k(µ− l)2, l + 0.25
k
)
{x− 0.25
k
, x+ 0.25
k
} if x ∈ [l + 0.25
k
, µ+ 0.25
k
)
{µ} if x ∈ [µ+ 0.25
k
, h]
2. If k > 0.5
h−l and µ ≥ max{h− 12k , l + 12k}:
{µ} if x ∈ [l, µ− 0.25
k
]
{x− 0.25
k
, x+ 0.25
k
} if x ∈ (µ− 0.25
k
, h− 0.25
k
]
{h−
√
h−x
k
, h} if x ∈ (h− 0.25
k
, h− k(h− µ)2)
{µ} ifx ∈ [h− k(h− µ)2, h]
3. If l + 1
2k
≤ µ ≤ h− 1
2k
:
{x− 0.25k , x+ 0.25k } if x ∈ (µ− 0.25k , µ+ 0.25k ){µ} if x ∈ [l, µ− 0.25
k
] ∪ [µ+ 0.25
k
, h]
4. If k > 0.5
h−l and h− 12k < µ < l + 12k :
{µ} if x ∈ [l, l + k(µ− l)2]
{l, l +
√
x−l
k
} if x ∈ (l + k(µ− l)2, l + 0.25
k
)
{x− 0.25
k
, x+ 0.25
k
} if x ∈ [l + 0.25
k
, h− 0.25
k
]
{h−
√
h−x
k
, h} if x ∈ (h− 0.25
k
, h− k(µ− h)2)
{µ} if x ∈ [h− k(µ− h)2, h]
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5. If k ≤ 0.5
h−l : 
{µ} if x ∈ [l, l + k(µ− l)2]
{l, l +
√
x−l
k
} if x ∈ (l + k(µ− l)2, l + k(h− l)2)
{l, h} if x ∈ [l + k(h− l)2, h− k(h− l)2]
{h−
√
h−x
k
, h} if x ∈ (h− k(h− l)2, h− k(µ− h)2)
{µ} if x ∈ [h− k(µ− h)2h]
Proof. R’s stage 2 payoffs for a stage 2 belief y are given by
U2(y;x) = max{x, y} − k(x− µ)2.
This is piecewise concave. We first obtain the concavification of U2(y;x) over [l, h] and then
use it to find the optimal garbling.
The concavification of U2(y;x) is obtained by joining two points y1, y2 (in a straight line)
with l ≤ y1 < x < y2 ≤ h. By the definition of concavification of a function, we must have14
U ′2(y1;x) ≤
U2(y2;x)− U2(y1;x)
y2 − y1 ≤ U
′
2(y2;x), (1)
with the first inequality holding with equality if y1 > l and the second one holding with
equality if y2 < h.
The solution to Inequation 1 with both equalities is
y1 = x− 0.25
k
, y2 = x+
0.25
k
.
If l + 1
4k
< x < h− 1
4k
, the concavification is given by y1 = x− 0.25k , y2 = x+ 0.25k .
If x ≤ min{l + 1
4k
, h − 1
4k
}, the lower bound l binds and the concavification has y1 = l.
y2 = l +
√
x−l
k
is obtained from the second equality in Inequation 1.
If x ≥ max{h− 1
4k
, l + 1
4k
}, the upper bound h binds and the concavification has y2 = h.
y1 = h−
√
h−x
k
is obtained from the first equality in Inequation 1.
14The best way to see this is to assume it is does not hold and see that the definition of concavification is
violated.
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If h− 1
4k
< x < l + 1
4k
, the concavification is:
1. y1 = l, y2 = l +
√
x−l
k
if l +
√
x−l
k
≤ h.
2. y2 = h, y1 = h−
√
h−x
k
if h−
√
h−x
k
≥ l.
3. y1 = l, y2 = h otherwise.
Having obtained the concavification for any x, the optimal stage 2 garbling has support
{y1, y2} if µ ∈ (y1, y2), and support {µ} otherwise. Straightforward algebra then gives us the
stated result. 
Lemma A.2. 1. If k > 0.5
h−l and µ ≤ min{h− 12k , l + 12k}, R’s optimal stage 1 garbling is
(a) Any Bayes plausible distribution with support drawn from the set {µ− 0.25
k
} ∪ [l +
0.25
k
, µ+ 0.25
k
] if µ ≥ l + 0.25
k
.
(b) The distribution with support {l, y1(µ)} with y1(µ) ∈ (µ, l + 0.25k ) if µ < l + 0.25k .
2. If k > 0.5
h−l and µ ≥ max{h− 12k , l + 12k}, R’s optimal stage 1 garbling is:
(a) Any Bayes plausible distribution with support drawn from the set [µ − 0.25
k
, h −
0.25
k
] ∪ {µ+ 0.25
k
} if µ ≤ h− 0.25
k
.
(b) The distribution with support {y2(µ), h} with y2(µ) ∈ (h− 0.25k , µ) if h− 0.25k < µ.
3. If l + 1
2k
≤ µ ≤ h− 1
2k
, R’s optimal stage 1 garbling is any Bayes plausible distribution
with support on [µ− 0.25
k
, µ+ 0.25
k
].
4. If k > 0.5
h−l and h− 12k < µ < l + 12k , R’s stage 1 optimal garbling is:
(a) Any Bayes plausible distribution with support drawn from {µ− 0.25
k
}∪ [l+ 0.25
k
, h−
0.25
k
] ∪ {µ+ 0.25
k
} if l + 0.25
k
≤ µ ≤ h− 0.25
k
.
(b) The distribution with support {l, y1(µ)} with y1(µ) ∈ (µ, l + 0.25k ) if µ < l + 0.25k .
(c) The distribution with support {y2(µ), h} with y2(µ) ∈ (h− 0.25k , µ) if h− 0.25k < µ.
5. If k ≤ 0.5
h−l , then R’s optimal stage 1 garbling is unique and has binary support. Exactly
one belief in the support is such that the optimal stage 2 garbling following it is {µ}.
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Proof. Let U1(x) be R’s first stage continuation payoffs for a first stage belief x. Say the
stage 2 distribution following x has support {y1, y2}, with y1 ≤ y2 and νy1 + (1− ν)y2 = µ.
Then U1(x) = νU2(y1;x) + (1− ν)U2(y2;x)− k(x− µ)2. The concavification of U1 over [l, h]
is used to obtain the stage 1 optimal distribution.
For any µ, U1 is continuous. Note that U1 is affine over any interval of x for which the
stage 2 optimal garbling is {x− 0.25
k
, x+ 0.25
k
}.
Remark. If the stage 1 optimal garbling is unique, then it cannot have support {µ}.
The reason for this is the following. If the stage 1 unique optimal garbling is degenerate,
then it is verified from Lemma A.1 that the stage 2 optimal garbling has binary support, say
{y1, y2}. But then, choosing the garbling {y1, y2} at stage 1 and {µ} at stage 2 must give the
same expected payoff, and hence must be optimal. This is a contradiction.
Now, first let k > 0.5
h−l and µ ≤ min{h− 12k , l + 12k}.
Then U1 is strictly convex in a right neighborhood of k(µ− l)2 and concave everywhere
else (weakly on (l + 0.25
k
, µ+ 0.25
k
)). Then, the concavification must join points z1 ≤ k(µ− l)2
and z2 > k(µ− l)2 (in a straight line), with z1, z2 determined by a condition analogous to
Inequation 1.
Say µ ≥ l + 0.25
k
. Then it is verified that z1 = µ − 0.25k and z2 = l + 0.25k . Since
µ ∈ [l + 0.25
k
, µ + 0.25
k
] and U1 is affine over this interval, a distribution with support on
{µ− 0.25
k
} ∪ [l + 0.25
k
, µ+ 0.25
k
] would be optimal.
Now say µ < l + 0.25
k
. Clearly the lower bound l would bind and z1 = l must hold. z2
is obtained from the second equality in Inequation 1, and it must be higher than µ, since
otherwise the optimal garbling would uniquely be degenerate, and we ruled that out above.
z2 is denoted by y1(µ) in the statement of the Lemma.
Now let k > 0.5
h−l and µ ≥ max{h− 12k , l+ 12k}. The argument is symmetric to the preceding
one.
In this case U1 is strictly convex in a left neighborhood of h − k(h − µ)2 and concave
everywhere else (weakly on (µ− 0.25
k
, h− 0.75
k
)). The concavification is obtained by joining
points z1 and z2 as before.
It is verified that for µ ≤ h − 0.25
k
, z1 = h − 0.25k and z2 = µ + 0.25k . This tells us that a
distribution with support on [µ− 0.25
k
, h− 0.25
k
] ∪ {µ+ 0.25
k
} would be optimal.
For µ > h− 0.25
k
, z2 = h must hold. Now z1 is found from the first equality in Inequation
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1, and it must be lower than µ, since otherwise the stage 1 optimal garbling would uniquely
be degenerate. z1 is denoted by y2(µ) in the statement of the Lemma.
Cases 3 and 4 are dealt with completely analogously.
Finally, let k ≤ 0.5
h−l .
Then U1 is strictly convex in a right neighborhood of k(µ− l)2, and in a left neighborhood
of h− k(h− µ)2, and strictly concave everywhere else.
The concavification therefore must:
1. join points z1 ∈ [l, l + k(µ− l)2) and z2 > l + k(µ− l)2 in a straight line, and
2. join points z3 < h− k(h− µ)2 and z4 ∈ (h− k(h− µ)2, h] in a straight line.
z2 ≤ µ ≤ z3 would imply that the unique optimal garbling is {µ}, and we know that
cannot be the case. Thus, we must have either z1 < µ < z2, in which case the optimal
garbling is {z1, z2}, or z3 < µ < z4, in which case it is {z3, z4}.
Further, it cannot be that z2 ≥ h − k(h − µ)2 or that z3 ≤ l + k(µ − l)2. If that were
the case, then Lemma A.1 would imply that the stage 2 distribution is necessarily {µ},
but then choosing {µ} must also be one of the optimal solution at stage 1, and that is a
contradiction. 
The previous result immediately gives us the following useful corollary.
Corollary A.2.1. The following two statements are equivalent:
1. µ ∈ [l + 0.25
k
, h− 0.25
k
] and k > 0.5
h−l .
2. There are multiple stage 1 optimal garblings for R, including support {µ} and support
{µ− 0.25
k
, µ+ 0.25
k
}.
Lemma A.3. Suppose k > 0.5
h−l and µ ∈ [l + 0.25k , h− 0.25k ]. If R’s behavior is as specified in
Lemmata A.1 and A.2, then conditional on being the first sender to be visited, the probability
of being selected is the same regardless of which stage 1 optimal garbling is chosen by R.
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Proof. We show the proof for µ ≤ min{h− 1
2k
, l + 1
2k
}. It is entirely analogous for the other
cases from Lemma A.1.
Suppose l + 0.25
k
≤ µ ≤ min{h− 1
2k
, l + 1
2k
} and R’s first stage response is a distribution
F on {µ− 0.25
k
} ∪ [l + 0.25
k
, µ+ 0.25
k
].
Using Lemma A.1 it is easy to see that the probability of the first sender being selected
conditional on a first stage belief x is given by
P (x) =
0 if x = µ− 0.25k2kx− 2kµ+ 0.5 if x ∈ [l + 0.25
k
, µ+ 0.25
k
]
Suppose that F places a mass p ≥ 0 on µ− 0.25
k
. Then conditional on being visited first,
a sender’s expected probability of being selected is given by
V1 = p ∗ 0 +
∫ µ+ 0.25
k
l+ 0.25
k
P (x) dF (x) (2)
Next note that
p(µ− 0.25
k
) +
∫ µ+ 0.25
k
l+ 0.25
k
xdF (x) = µ (3)
and
∫ µ+ 0.25
k
l+ 0.25
k
dF (x) = 1− p (4)
Using Equations 3 and 4 in Equation 2, we get that V1 = 0.5, which is independent of
F . 
A.1 Proof of Proposition 7
Suppose each sender offers support {l, h}, with l ∈ [0, µ) and h ∈ (µ, 1].
First let k > 0.5
(h−l) and µ ∈ [l + 0.25k , h− 0.25k ].
Given a stage 1 draw x, R’s optimal stage 2 garbling is specified in Lemma A.1. If this
garbling does not have support {µ}, R necessarily visits the second sender. If it is {µ}, she
is indifferent between visiting him and not, and may choose either way.
At stage 1, she has multiple best responses. The most informative one among them
has support {µ− 0.25
k
, µ+ 0.25
k
}, and from Lemma A.2 it is the only one that is necessarily
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followed by no learning at stage 2. We assume that she breaks her indifference in favor of
this distribution.
At belief µ− 0.25
k
she accepts the first sender with certainty, and at belief µ+ 0.25
k
accepts
the other one with certainty.
Then if a sender deviates to a different distribution, his payoffs may be affected only if he
is visited first and the distribution he deviates to is such that {µ − 0.25
k
, µ + 0.25
k
} is not a
garbling of it.
In this case, regardless of the deviation, R can secure a payoff equal to what she gets in
the absence of the deviation, by picking {µ} at stage 1, followed by visiting the other sender
and choosing {µ− 0.25
k
, µ+ 0.25
k
}. Thus the deviation cannot force R to choose from outside
the set of optimal garblings from Lemma A.2.
But then due to Lemma A.3, the deviating sender’s payoffs are unaffected. Thus, there
does not exist a profitable deviation and we have an equilibrium.
Next say that either k > 0.5
(h−l) and µ 6∈ [l + 0.25k , h− 0.25k ], or k ≤ 0.5(h−l) .
Then from Lemmata A.2 and A.1, R chooses a unique binary garbling at stage 1, and
exactly one belief in the support is followed by a visit to the second sender.
Denote the stage 1 belief following which R does learn at stage 2 by w. Under each
possibility we show that there is a profitable deviation for a sender.
Possibility 1 : If w < µ, then deviating to support {l′, h} is profitable, where l′ is such that
w = l′ + k(µ− l′)2. From Lemma A.1, if the deviating sender is visited second, R chooses
support {µ} and selects the deviating sender with certainty. This does not affect R’s behavior
if the deviating sender is visited first, since l′ < w.
Possibility 2 : If w > µ and is followed by a stage 2 best response {l +
√
w−l
k
}, then it
must be true that w ∈ (l + k(µ− l)2, l + 0.25
k
). A deviation to support {l, h′} is profitable for
h′ such that w < h′ < l+
√
w−l
k
. Then k ≤ 0.5
h′−l , and Lemma A.1 tells us that if the deviating
sender is visited at stage 2, R’s response changes to {l, h′}. w < h′ < l +
√
w−l
k
implies that
this is profitable if visited at stage 2, without affecting what happens if visited at stage 1.
Possibility 3 : If w > µ and is followed by a stage 2 best response of either {l, h} or
{h −
√
h−w
k
, h}. As discussed also by Wei (2018), an optimal solution exists for a single
sender faced with a receiver with threshold of acceptance w. Here, it is seen that w < h, so
that h does not bind at stage 1. This implies that a sender can increase or decrease h slightly
without affecting what happens if he is visited first. Such a profitable deviation can always
be found unless offering {l, h} is the optimal response for a single sender, given threshold
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w. It can be verified15 that if indeed {l, h} is the optimal response for a single sender, then
condition 1 is not satisfied for w. 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
See the proof of Proposition 7, setting l = 0, h = 1.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Existence of the uninformative equilibrium is proven in the text. Here we show non-existence
of a full information equilibrium.
Suppose that each sender chooses a fully informative distribution. Because each sender
has chosen the same distribution (on path), R is indifferent as to whom she visits first.
Hence, suppose that she visits sender 1 first with probability λ ∈ [0, 1] and sender 2 with its
complement.
If sender 1 is visited first, then upon R’s visit, 1 is realized with probability µ. At this
point, she will stop and select sender 1. On the other hand, if 0 is realized then she will select
sender 2 without visiting. The symmetric statements hold for sender 2 and her payoff is
u2 = λ(1− µ) + (1− λ)µ
Now suppose that sender 2 deviates and chooses a distribution that consists of 1 with
probability η := µ − 1/n, n ∈ N, n > 1/µ, and  with probability 1 + 1/n − µ, where
 := 1/(n+ 1− µn). If sender 1 is visited first then again sender 2 obtains an expected payoff
of (1− µ). If sender 2 is visited first, with probability η, 1 is realized and sender 2 is selected
and with probability (1 − η),  is realized. At this point R visits sender 1 and obtains a
realization of 0 with probability 1− µ, at which point she selects sender 2. Accordingly,
u2 = λ(1− µ) + (1− λ) (η + (1− η)(1− µ))
and so sender 2 has a profitable deviation if and only if
λ(1− µ) + (1− λ) (η + (1− η)(1− µ)) > λ(1− µ) + (1− λ)µ
15Details of the algebra are available on request.
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which reduces to
1 + 2n−√1 + 4n
2n
> µ
provided λ < 1. Without loss of generality we may assume this, since otherwise the same
argument would suffice for a deviation by sender 1.
The limit of the left hand side goes to 1 as n goes to ∞; hence for any µ < 1 there exists
a nˆ such that the left hand side is strictly greater than µ for all n > nˆ. We conclude that for
any µ < 1 there exists a profitable deviation, negating the possibility that full information is
an equilibrium. 
A.4 Proof of Claim 5
For µ ≤ 1
2
:
Let each sender choose the uniform distribution on [0, 2µ], and suppose that R visits
sender 1 first with probability λ ∈ [0, 1] and sender 2 with its complement.
No matter the realization at stage 1, R will proceed and visit the other sender as well
before selecting one of them. Hence, u1 = u2 = 1/2. Next, we check for a profitable deviation.
Suppose sender 1 deviates to a distribution that contains a probability measure of size a on
[2µ, 1] and some portion F on [0, 2µ). It is clear that it is without loss of generality to set a
to be a point mass on 2µ.
If sender 1 is visited first then with probability a, he is selected and sender 2 is never
visited; and otherwise, sender 2 is visited after which R selects the sender with the highest
realization. If sender 2 is visited first, then no matter what, sender 1 is also visited, after
which the comparison ensues.
Sender 1’s payoff is
u1 = λ
(
a+
∫ 2µ
0
∫ x
0
dG(y)dF (x)
)
+(1− λ)
(
a+
∫ 2µ
0
∫ x
0
dGdF
)
= a+
∫ 2µ
0
∫ x
0
dG(y)dF (x)
whereG(y) = y/(2µ) is the (on-path) distribution chosen by sender 2 and where
∫ 2µ
0
dF = 1−a
and
∫ 2µ
0
xdF = 2− 2µa.
Next, we use the result in Whitmeyer and Whitmeyer (2019) who establish that it suffices
to show that 1 has no profitable deviation to any binary distribution. Let F be described
by α with probability p and β with probability 1 − p; where 0 ≤ α ≤ µ, µ ≤ β ≤ 2µ, and
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αp+ β(1− p) = µ. Consequently, we rewrite u1, which becomes
u1 = (1− p)F (β) + pF (α)
= (1− p) β
2µ
+ p
α
2µ
=
1
2
Hence, there is no profitable deviation. 
For µ > 1
2
:
On path, sender 1’s payoff is
u1 = λ
(
2− 1
µ
+
∫ 2(1−µ)
0
∫ x
0
1
2µ
1
2µ
dydx
)
+ (1− λ)
((
1
µ
− 1
)(
2− 1
µ
)
+
∫ 2(1−µ)
0
∫ x
0
1
2µ
1
2µ
dydx
)
=
2 (2µ− 1)2 λ+ (1− µ) (3µ− 1)
2µ2
If sender 1 deviates to 1 with probability µ and 0 with probability 1 − µ, his payoff from
deviating is
uD1 = λµ+ (1− λ)
(
1
µ
− 1
)
µ = 1 + 2λµ− λ− µ
The difference, uD1 − u1 is
(1− µ)2 (2µ− 1) (2λ− 1)
2µ2
Since µ > 1/2, this is positive provided λ > 1/2 and negative provided λ < 1/2. Thus, if
λ 6= 1/2 there exists a profitable deviation (if λ < 1/2, sender 2 can deviate profitably in the
analogous fashion).
It remains to show that this vector of distributions is an equilibrium for λ = 1/2.
Substituting λ = 1/2 into u1, we see that u1 = 1/2 on path. Just as for µ ≤ 1/2, from
Whitmeyer and Whitmeyer (2019) we need check only deviations to binary distributions. Let
F be described by α with probability p and β with probability 1− p, where αp+β(1− p) = µ
and 0 ≤ α ≤ µ. There are two cases that we need to consider. 1. µ ≤ β ≤ 2(1− µ); and 2.
β = 1. In the first case,
u1 = (1− p)F (β) + pF (α)
= (1− p) β
2µ
+ p
α
2µ
=
1
2
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and in the second case
u1 =
1
2
(1− p+ pF (α)) + 1
2
((
1
µ
− 1
)
(1− p) + pF (α)
)
= p
α
2µ
+
1− p
2µ
=
1
2
where we used the fact that β = 1 implies that 1− p = µ− pα. Hence, there is no profitable
deviation. 
A.5 Proof of Lemma 5.1
See the proof of Lemma A.1, setting l = 0, h = 1 and k = 1.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 5.2
See the proof of Lemma A.2, setting l = 0, h = 1 and k = 1.
A.7 Proof of Lemma 5.3
See the proof of Lemma A.3, setting l = 0, h = 1 and k = 1.
A.8 Proof of Claim 6
Let k > 1
2
and µ ∈ [ 1
4k
, 1− 1
4k
]. As shown in Appendix A.1, one of R’s best responses to full
information (l = 0, h = 1) from both senders is to choose the garbling {µ − 1
4k
, µ + 1
4k
} at
stage 1 and to learn nothing at stage 2.
Suppose sender i offers a distribution of which {µ− 1
4k
, µ+ 1
4k
} is a garbling. Then, the
aforementioned best response to full information is permissible, and thus continues to be a
best response. Suppose R chooses this response.
Then if a sender unilaterally deviates and is the one to be visited first, R may respond by
choosing {µ} and visiting the other sender, choosing {µ− 1
4k
, µ + 1
4k
} for him. Exactly as
in the proof for existence of a full information equilibrium (Proposition 7 for h = 1, l = 0),
Lemma A.3 can be used to argue that the deviation cannot be profitable. 
A.9 Proof of Corollary 6.1
For µ ≤ 1
2
:
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We show that {µ− 1
4k
, µ+ 1
4k
} is a mean preserving contraction of the uniform distribution
on [0, 2µ] when k ≥ 1
2µ
.
Define l(x) as
l(x) =

0 0 ≤ x < µ− 1
4k
1
2
x− µ
2
+ 1
8k
µ− 1
4k
≤ x < µ+ 1
4k
x− µ µ+ 1
4k
≤ x ≤ 1
Define j(x) :=
∫ x
0
G(t)dt:
j(x) =
x
2
4µ
0 ≤ x < 2µ
x− µ 2µ ≤ x ≤ 1
It suffices to show that µ > 1/(4k), that j(x)− l(x) = 0 has at most one real root, and that
j (µ+ 1/(4k)) > l (µ+ 1/(4k)).
Set j(x) = l(x), which holds if and only if
x =
4µk ±√8kµ (1− 2kµ)
4k
This is imaginary if and only if
k >
1
2µ
and has a unique root for k = 1/(2µ) (at µ). µ − 1/(4k) ≥ µ/2 > 0 for k ≥ 1/(2µ). It
remains to verify that j (µ+ 1/(4k)) > k (µ+ 1/(4k)); but it is simple to verify that this
must hold. Thus, if k ≥ 1/(2µ), we have the result.
For µ > 1
2
:
The proof is analogous to the preceding one, with the exception that k must be sufficiently
large so that µ + 1/(4k) ≤ 1. This holds if and only if k ≥ 1/(4(1 − µ)). This constraint
binds for µ ≥ 2/3 and k ≥ 1/(2µ) binds for µ ≤ 2/3. 
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